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DETAIL OF ARGUMENTS 
Introduction 
If Liberty Mutual's brief were the only brief read, the question would come to 
mind as to why anyone would contest the conduct of Liberty Mutual or the trial court 
in this case in dismissing the bad faith counterclaim or finding against Burdene 
Shores' right to claim the stated declarations policy liability limits. 
After all, according to the honorable counsel for Liberty Mutual, on the one 
hand - for purposes of bad faith - Burdene Shores is a third party stranger to the 
insurance contract she entered into with Liberty Mutual; and, yet when it suits their 
purposes to provide an alternative liability limit, Burdene Shores is required to know 
and presumed to know, be intimately familiar with and be bound by the hidden details 
of the undisclosed1 provisions of that same insurance policy which control the 
relationship between the parties. 
Burdene Shores' Bad Faith Claim and Liberty Mutual's Duty of Good Faith 
and Fair Dealing 
In their argument, Liberty Mutual's position presumes the validity in this case 
of die legal fiction that Burdene Shores is strictly a third party to the insurance 
1
 "Undisclosed" meaning that the provisions which Liberty Mutual claims 
bind the Shores, were never pointed out to the Shores, never disclosed in a 
reasonably findable place in the declarations to the insurance policy or elsewhere 
and never disclosed in a single place in language reasonably understandable by a 
normal person - let alone the Shores who are elderly, retired persons in their 70s 
and 80s. 
1 
contract. 
If Burdene Shores truly were only a third party stranger, the analysis would 
need go no further and Liberty Mutual should prevail on the bad faith claim. 
However, factually Burdene Shores is in actual, direct privity of contract with 
Liberty Mutual. She is a named insured to the insurance contract. 
More importantly, because of her status as a named insured in direct privity of 
contract with Liberty Mutual, Liberty Mutual claims Burdene Shores is bound by a 
family exclusion liability limitation which it can enforce against no real third party to 
the insurance contract - the $25,000 family exclusion liability limit. If Burdene 
Shores were not a named insured, the liability limit unquestionably would be 
$100,000 for her injuries. 
Liberty Mutual's brief asserts as absolute the allegation that where liability of 
an insurance company is based upon a family member's tort liability, there can be no 
bad faith2. 
As was pointed out in Appellant Burdene Shores' Brief, Burdene Shores 
occupies the positions of both a first party and third party claimant - not strictly a 
third party claimant as Liberty Mutual contends. 
The underlying liability of Liberty Mutual to Burdene Shores is based first 
upon the tortuous acts of her husband, Unior Shores. Bad faith is alleged based upon 
the refusal of Liberty Mutual to settle at the first party contractual family exclusion 
liability limit cap. 
2
 See page 13, Liberty Mutual's Brief. 
2 
The liability limit cap which Liberty Mutual seeks to impose on Burdene 
Shores is a $25,000 family exclusion policy limit based solely upon Burdene Shores' 
first party contractual relationship with Liberty Mutual. 
In Blackv. Allstate. 2004 UT 66 (Utah 2004) the Utah Supreme Court stated: 
"If 14 Allstate argues that, like the plaintiff in Sperry^ Black, as the injured 
third party, has no standing to bring an action against Allstate based on 
Allstate's handling of the Black claim against its insured, Gallagher. Allstate 
contends that, when handling the Black claim, any duties it owed ran only to 
Gallagher by virtue of its role as Gallagher's liability insurer. Thus, Allstate 
concludes, and the district court agreed, that since Black is not a party 
to the relevant insurance policy between Allstate and Gallagher, Black 
cannot maintain an action against Allstate at any time because such an 
action is prohibited under Utah law. We disagree, [emphasis added] 
Tfl5 Although Allstate's reasoning may be correct with regard to its handling 
of the Black claim against Gallagher, Allstate mischaracterizes the nature of 
Black's cause of action. In viewing Black's complaint in this case, it is clear 
that Black does not take issue with Allstate's conduct in processing his claim 
against Gallagher. Rather, Black argues that Allstate breached the duties it 
owed to him in handling Gallagher's claim against him. Black pleaded in his 
complaint that, when processing the Gallagher claim, Allstate breached duties 
it owed to Black by "failing to adequately investigate the facts of the accident 
and by unreasonably determining that [Black] was primarily at fault." Black 
asserted that he had "been damaged by . . . Allstate's breach by increased 
premiums paid due to Allstate's erroneous assessment," and suffered "losses 
due to decreased insurability because of the improperly allowed claim on his 
driving record." 
1[16 When handling the Gallagher claim, Allstate acted in its capacity as 
Black's liability insurer and, therefore, potentially owed duties to Black based 
on Black's insurance policy. Hence, Black properly asserted a cause of action 
against Allstate based on his own contractual relationship with Allstate, and 
not on any alleged mishandling of the Black claim, which would only have 
implicated Allstate's contractual relationship with Gallagher. (fh2) 
Accordingly, we next consider what duties Allstate owed to Black in handling 
Gallagher's claim against him. 
It is important to understand in this case what the bad faith claim of Burdene 
3 
Shores against Liberty Mutual is not. 
The bad faith claim is not based on a failure or refusal of Liberty Mutual to 
pay the reasonable value of the claim within the stated $100,000 policy limits based 
on Burdene Shores' injuries and damages. 
It is not based on a refusal to settle the total claim in the fashion they should 
have settled it. 
The bad faith claim is based upon Liberty Mutual5 s failure and refusal - after 
repeated request - to pay the contractually limited minimum cap which is undeniably 
due to Burdene Shores. Liberty Mutual has paid that $25,000 into the court in 
recognition of their liability for this contractually based minimum amount. Liberty 
Mutual has failed and refused to release or agree to the release of the $25,000 to 
Burdene Shores without a complete release of all claims for which Liberty Mutual 
may have ultimate liability. 
The bad faith claim against Liberty Mutual is thus based on a mixture of first 
and third party elements. The underlying tort claim against Unior Shores (ergo 
Liberty Mutual) for damages to Burdene Shores depends on the tort liability of Unior 
Shores for Burdene Shores' injuries. But, the bad faith refusal to settle claim is 
based on the refusal of Liberty Mutual to pay the $25,000 family exclusion minimum 
liability limit which they have refused to pay and which they acknowledge owing. 
There is no question that Liberty Mutual is obligated to pay the $25,000 family 
exclusion liability limit based on the claimed contractually limited family exclusion 
4 
amount which they have refused to pay without a complete release of all other 
claims by Burdene Shores. 
The bad faith claim against Liberty Mutual is thus based on first party 
elements; and, comes within the public policy statement of Utah Administrative Rule 
R590-190-9, titled "Unfair Methods, Deceptive Acts and Practices Defined" in 
subsection (8) in further clarification of Utah Code §31 A-26-303(2)( c) and (3)(h)3, 
which specifies the following to be misleading, deceptive, unfairly discriminatory or 
overreaching in the settlement of claims: 
" the failure to settle (and pay) claims by persons in privity of contract with an 
insurer within 30 days of the claim being made when liability is reasonably 
clear under one coverage in order to influence settlements under other 
portions of the insurance policy coverage." 
The rule and statute speak about "privity of contract" - not first party claims 
and third party claims. And, they speak of liability being "reasonably clear." Both 
these tests apply in this case to the $25,000 family exclusion amount which Liberty 
Mutual has refused to pay to Burdene Shores without a complete release of all 
liability claims. 
3
 Utah Code §31A-26-303 states in pertinent part: 
"(2)(c) failing to settle a claim promptly under one portion of the insurance policy 
coverage, where liability and the amount of loss are reasonably clear, in order to 
influence settlements under other portions of the insurance policy coverage, but this 
Subsection (2) (c) applies only to claims made by persons in direct privity of 
contract with the insurer." 
"(3)(h)(h) not attempting in good faith to effectuate a prompt, fair, and equitable 
settlement of claims in which liability is reasonably clear. 
5 
Because there is actual direct privity of contract and the fact that the bad faith 
claim is based on the first party relationship between Burdene Shores and Liberty 
Mutual, this bad faith claim comes within the purview of Black v. Allstate, supra and 
Utah Administrative Rule R590-190-9, supra., in clarification of Utah Code §31A-
26-303. 
If it is true, as counsel for Liberty Mutual claims, that Burdene Shores has a 
reduced right of recovery because of the contractually reduced household exclusion 
liability limit cap of $25,0004, that reduced liability limit only exists because of the 
first party contractual relationship between Burdene Shores and Liberty Mutual; and, 
is therefore a valid basis for a first party bad faith claim.. 
Counsel for Liberty Mutual argues the holding of Sperrv v. Sperrv 990 P.2d 
381, 1999 UT 101 (Utah 1999)5:: 
"Contrary to Mrs. Shore's [sic] arguments, the existence of the household 
provision was completely irrelevant to the holding. The Court in Sperrv never 
made any mention that the injured party's status could change because of the 
household exclusion and the potential reduced right of recovery. 
Furthermore, the plaintiff in Sperry never made this argument, and there is 
simply no support for Mrs. Shore's [sic] position that her case can be 
distinguished from Sperrv because Liberty Mutual maintains that the 
household exclusion applies. The existence or non-existence of the household 
exclusion doesn't make a difference." 
The Sperrv case is important because Liberty Mutual claims it is 
determinative as to whether a bad faith claim can be made against Liberty Mutual at 
4
 Last paragraph, page 8 of Liberty Mutual's brief. 
5
 Last paragraph, page 13 of Liberty Mutual's brief. 
6 
all; and, that it is - in their words - "directly on point".6 
Liberty Mutual's argument that the existence or non-existence of the 
household exclusion is irrelevant is interesting. If the non-existence of the 
household exclusion in Sperrv makes no difference, why is it prominently stated in 
footnote 1 to that opinion, as follows: 
"Additionally, we understand that the parties, during settlement negotiations, 
agreed that the household exclusion would not apply and eventually settled the 
wrongful death claim for the $100,000 policy limit. In light of that 
circumstance, it is difficult to see how Annette could prove any damages 
under her misrepresentation claim. Therefore, we decline to address this 
issue. " 
Nowhere in the opinion is there any discussion as to whether the household 
exclusion would have made any difference if it had been present in regard to the bad 
faith claim. It is simply not addressed - although it was obviously considered, or it 
would not have been prominently displayed in the opinion. Liberty Mutual is in part 
correct because in Sperrv the household exclusion was truly irrelevant to the holding 
because it played no part in the holding of that case. In this case the household 
exclusion policy limit is central and highly relevant because it is the basis underlying 
the bad faith claim of Burdene Shores against Liberty Mutual and has resulted in 
damages to Burdene Shores because of Liberty Mutual's failure to pay that $25,000 
there is no question is due. The household exclusion policy limit is also central to 
Liberty Mutual's liability to Burdene Shores for anything beyond the $25,000 family 
6
 Third paragraph, page 12 of Liberty Mutual's brief. 
7 
exclusion liability limit. 
The existence of the family exclusion liability limit, based on the first party 
contract between Liberty Mutual and Burdene Shores, is a sufficient first party nexus 
to give rise to a bad faith claim for refusal to pay the contractually based family 
exclusion liability limit cap. Liberty Mutual has acknowledged the money is due by 
paying it into the court, but has refused to allow its release without a release of all 
claims against Liberty Mutual. 
The undersigned does not have access to the arguments of the plaintiff in 
Sperry* and it does not appear to be part of the published record in that case. 
Liberty Mutual claims this case is directly on point with Sperry - it is not. 
The non-existence of an argument in Sperry in the published record does not make 
the issue non-relevant to this case when that is a primary distinguishing factor 
between Sperry and this case. 
Violation of Utah Code §31A-21-308. 
Without citation of any authority or any persuasive argument, Liberty Mutual 
claims that the varying "risks" specified in Utah Code §31A-21-308 mean only 
differing types of coverage7 It would be helpfiil if counsel for Liberty Mutual would 
point out where in the statutes or case law that definition occurs - my version of the 
7
 See Liberty Mutual Brief, first paragraph, page 18. See also discussion beginning on 
page 25 of Burdene Shores Brief. 
8 
statutes and no Utah case I have found have such a minimizing and exclusive 
definition. 
Liberty Mutual bolsters its argument by stating that the family exclusion is 
really simply one of multiple exclusions and limitations. There are multiple 
exclusions, but there is only one policy limitation not contained in the declarations. 
The family exclusion liability limitation is that singular limitation. Unless 
exclusions and limitations are the same thing, that assertion by counsel for Liberty 
Mutual is false. 
The family exclusion liability limit is the only exclusion in the Liberty Mutual 
insurance policy which imposes a differing liability limit - most especially one not 
specified in the declarations. The argument is equivalent to stating that a pig is an 
animal and a chicken is an animal, and because they are both animals a pig is a 
chicken. 
Even though Liberty Mutual claims the family exclusion liability limit is only 
an exclusion, it is also a liability limit by whatever name Liberty Mutual or their 
counsel choose to designate it.8 The true status is as both an exclusion and a 
liability limit. 
Additionally, and more importantly, the family exclusion liability limit is not 
clearly stated such that a normal insurance purchaser would understand it's terms as 
8
 Liberty Mutual repeatedly in these proceedings refers to the family exclusion as a limit 
of liability - See for example Liberty Mutual Brief, page 7, paragraph 5.. 
9 
required by Utah Code §31A-21 -308. It has conflicting, contrary provisions 
scattered in multiple places in the insurance policy. See arguments in Appellant 
Burdene Shores' Brief, page 31, et seq. 
Multiply stated, conflicting versions of essentially the same provision are 
about as far away from clarity as one might stray - unless the real intent of Liberty 
Mutual is to confuse the insurance purchaser - especially the elderly senior citizens 
to whom Liberty Mutual markets their insurance policies. 
Public Policy Arguments 
In their brief, Liberty Mutual apparently places great reliance on Racklev v. 
Fairview Care. 23 P.3d 1022, 2001 UT 32 (Utah 2001) for the generic proposition 
that all public policy must fit into the category of "clear public policy" and is only 
defined by one of three sources: (1) legislative enactments, (2) constitutional 
standards; or, (3) judicial decisions."9 A careful reading of Racklev reveals that the 
standards which are enunciated therein apply only to a claim of violation of public 
policy in the context of termination of "at will" employment. See, for example, 
Racklev. supra, at page 1026 wherein the court said: 
"If 15 The public policy exception to the employment at-will presumption is 
much narrower than traditional notions of public policy Only "clear and 
substantial public policies will support a claim of wrongful discharge in 
violation of public policy.11.. . The nature and scope of what constitutes a 
"clear and substantial" public policy, however, is not always easily discernible. 
9
 See Liberty Mutual Brief, page 19, second paragraph, et seq.. 
10 
See, e.g., Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 276, 306, 50 S.Ct. 253, 74 L.Ed. 
854 (1930) ("The truth is that the theory of public policy embodies a doctrine 
of vague and variable quality. . . ."). "In Utah, we have frequently invoked the 
concept of public policy without articulating precisely its origin or 
definition." Berube, 111 P.2d at 1042; see also Fox, 931 P.2d at 860 (stating 
that "a more precise definition of the term must await the time when this 
Court has had sufficient experience with a number of cases"); Peterson, 832 
P.2d at 1282 ("The identification of clear and substantial public policies will 
require case-by-case development."). 
Even though Liberty Mutual's arguments and statements about the necessity of 
"clear public policy5' are not the law in regard to automobile insurance policies, some 
response to their arguments is required. 
Case law Cited by Liberty Mutual 
Counsel for Liberty Mutual characterizes Burdene Shores' reliance on Justice 
Durham's dissent in State Farm v. Mastbaum 1987.UT.33L 748 P.2d 1042 (Utah 
1987) as a reliance on Utah Code §31 A-22-309. Such characterization by counsel 
for Liberty Mutual is a false representation. 
Other than the convenient opportunity to attack Burdene Shores' position it 
creates, there is little basis for Liberty Mutual's argument. If one simply reads 
Justice Durham's dissent - a copy of the decision is attached to this brief in the 
addendum - it is clear that assertion by Liberty Mutual is false. 
There were two separate opinions upholding the decision in Mastbaum for 
differing reasons. The claimed "majority" opinion has no precedent value today 
(post-1986) at all - it was not supported by a majority of the court. Only the result 
11 
for cases arising before 1986 was supported by a majority of the court. 
Justice Durham's dissent mMastbaum speaks to the actions of the legislature 
in amending Utah Code §31A-22-303 through §31A-22-309, with §31A-22-303 
providing the main focus. The §31A-22-309 amendments, by the terms of the 
statute, relate to PIP coverage and were apparently thrown in by Justice Durham to 
bolster her position - but they are not necessary at all to her argument. 
A lack of Justice Durham's Utah Code §31 A-22-309 arguments in no way 
defeats the reasoning or basis of Justice Durham's dissent and does not change the 
underlying position oiMastbaum at all as Liberty Mutual apparently contends. The 
concurring opinion of Justice Zimmerman and the dissent of Justice Durham 
constitute a majority of the court; and, post-1986 should control in Utah unless 
explicitly overruled. 
Justice Durham stated in her dissent, at page 1046: 
"This interpretation of the automobile insurance statutory scheme is bolstered 
by the record of the state senate's consideration of a proposed amendment in 
Senate Bill 91 to section 31A-22--303. Senate Bill 91 contained a large 
number of amendments to Utah's insurance laws. The majority of these 
amendments were suggested to the legislature by the Insurance Code Task 
Force, which was comprised primarily of representatives of the insurance 
industry, as well as several members of the state legislature. The task force 
minutes from January 10, 1986, reflect that the draft version of Senate Bill 91 
was changed to add an additional clause to section 31A-22-303. That clause 
was to be inserted as subsection (d) under subsection (3), and the subsection 
was then to read as follows: " 
(3)"Motor vehicle liability coverage need not insure any liability: 
(a) under any workers compensation law under Title 35; 
(b) resulting from bodily injury to or death of an employee of 
the named insured, other than a domestic employee, while 
12 
engaged in the employment of the insured, or while engaged in 
the operation, maintenance, or repair of a designated vehicle; 
(c) resulting from damage to property owned by, rented to, 
bailed to, or transported by the insured; or 
(d) resulting front bodily injury or death of any insured or any 
member of an insured's family residing in the insured's 
household." 
"Utah SB. 91, 46th Leg. draft version 1-06-86, at 319-20 (emphasis added 
[in the original]). 
"Thus, when presented to the senate for consideration in January 1986, Senate 
Bill 91 explicitly allowed insurers to exclude household members from 
coverage under automobile liability policies. This version of the bill 
apparently remained unchallenged until February 24, 1986. On that date, 
Senator Hillyard moved to amend Senate Bill 91 to delete the clause allowing 
the household exclusion from section 31A-22-303(3) because the legislature 
had not properly considered the exclusion's extensive impact." 
"In arguing to delete the pertinent language, Senator Hillyard pointed out the 
unfair and adhesive nature of this type of exclusion. He stated, "What you're 
going to do is end up with people with exposure who think they have insurance 
to cover them, but by this exclusion, they're not going to have any insurance." 
Senator Hillyard then requested the senate membership to "vote affirmatively 
to remove this [household exclusion] and let it be put in later if that's the 
decision of the legislature through legislative intent." 
"A member of the task force told the senate membership that the task force 
itself had fully considered the household exclusion question and felt that it 
was appropriate and based on sound public policy. Nonetheless, the senate 
voted to approve Senator Hillyard's amendment, thereby deleting the language 
allowing a household exclusion in liability policies. This process, combined 
with the straight-forward language in section 31A-22-309, suggests that the 
legislature has never intended to permit household exclusion clauses. Thus, 
the majority opinion's premise regarding legislative intent is at least open to 
question." 
Any direct legislative approval of the household exclusion is still absent from 
Utah Code §31A-22-303; and, direct affirmative legislative approval of the 
household exclusion is still totally absent from all Utah statutes Apparently the 
legislature has never had the intent to place the household exclusion in the statutes as 
13 
Senator Hillyard suggested - if indeed, the legislature ever thought it was 
appropriate at all. 
Approval of the household exclusion in automobile liability insurance policies 
is not and has not been the intent of the legislature since passage of the 1986 
amendments. 
The intent of the legislature as reflected in the specific legislative removal of 
a proposed provision authorizing and allowing the household exclusion in automobile 
liability insurance policies controls the court's interpretation of legislative intent. 
The Utah Supreme Court has often evidenced the necessity in interpreting 
statutes according to legislative intent, such as in State v. Hodges. 2002 UT 117, 63 
P.3d 66 (Utah 2002) wherein the court stated: 
If 6 "[0]ur primary goal in interpreting statutes is to give effect to the 
legislative intent, as evidenced by the plain language, in light of the purpose 
the statute was meant to achieve." State v. Burns. 2000 UT 56, % 25, 4 P.3d 
795. "We need look beyond the plain language only if we find some 
ambiguity." Id. 
The clear purpose of Utah Code §31A-22-304 is to provide minimum 
adequate liability insurance for Utah insurance consumers. There is no hint in the 
statute that a corollary purpose of that statute is to create a defacto maximum 
coverage for a class of Utah insureds. Liberty Mutual seeks to have Utah Code 
§31 A-22-304 define the defacto maximum coverage available to its Utah insureds 
under its policies of insurance - certainly not a purpose of that statute. 
Liberty Mutual argues for the validity of the household exclusion liability 
limit by arguing cases from other jurisdictions which do not have the same case law, 
14 
same legislative history, or same legislative intent as Utah; and, by arguing cases 
from Utah which are not factually on point. No Utah case is cited having a household 
exclusion which has been specifically rejected by the legislature which the court 
later upheld. 
Review of Utah Cases cited by Liberty Mutual: 
National Farmers Union Prop. & Casualty Co. v. Moore; 882 P.2d 1168 
(Utah App 1994). Young boy accidentally shot by his brother. Court upheld a 
household exclusion in property owner's insurance policy. 
Allen y. Prudential Property & Casualty Ins. Co.. 839 P.2d 798 (Utah 
1992). Young boy burned by pot of boiling water spilled on him Court upheld the 
household exclusion in property owner's policy against claim that it violated the 
reasonable expectations of the purchaser. 
Calhoun y. State Farm. 2004 UT 56, 96 P.3d 916 (Utah 2004). Alleging the 
invalidity of the exclusion for named drivers. The exclusion was upheld as being 
specifically provided for in Utah Code §31 A-22-303(7). 
Legislative Enactments Supporting the Household Exclusion 
To repeat what was said in Burdene Shores' Opening Brief at page 42: 
"Because specific statutorily authorized exclusions are permissible does not 
equate to the Liberty Mutual family exclusion being valid in this case. There 
is no statutory approval for the family exclusion." 
Perhaps most important is the fact that the legislature in 1986 specifically 
15 
rejected the family exclusion as a part of Utah Code §31 A-22-303(3).10 
Liberty Mutual argues a "clear inference" from Utah Code §31A-22-
304(1 )(a) that Liberty Mutual may limit liability coverage to greater than or equal to 
$25,000. 
If such is the case, and it probably is true as far as general liability limits in an 
automobile insurance policy are concerned, that does not mean that Liberty Mutual is 
free to impose a separate family exclusion liability limit which is not consistent with 
the general liability limit of the policy, not materially disclosed to insurance 
purchasers, and which is not based on differing risks as required by Utah Code §31A-
21-308. 
There are no legislative enactments which specifically approve the Liberty 
Mutual style family exclusion liability limit, or indeed any family exclusion. Liberty 
Mutual's arguments of indirect approval are tenuous at best and do not overcome the 
specific rejection of the family exclusion by the Utah legislature in 1986. 
Liberty Mutual also argues that the Shores' position would require insurers to 
offer more than the minimum liability amounts under Utah Code §31A-22-304.11 
Such a statement is without merit, false and has no logical basis. 
Utah Code §31 A-22-304 does not allow the issuance of liability insurance 
policies which have limits of less than $25,000. There is no preclusion of liability 
limits in excess of $25,000. The practicalities of the insurance market may dictate 
10
 See Justice Durham's dissent mMgstbgum., quoted supra. 
11
 See Liberty Mutual Brief, page 27, last paragraph. 
that higher disclosed policy limits are required to sell their policies, but the statute 
and the Shores' position in this case, if adopted, certainly do not require it. 
The practicalities of the insurance market may also dictate that Liberty Mutual 
cannot sell their insurance policy including the family exclusion liability limit, if 
they are forced - as this case seeks to do - to clearly state and disclose that liability 
limit and the associated risk factors of the family exclusion liability limit as required 
by Utah Code §31A-21-308. 
Meaningful disclosure of actual policy liability limits and other material 
terms would seem to be a good thing for everyone, except perhaps Liberty Mutual 
which apparently seeks to hide the true nature of their inferior insurance product 
from their customers. 
Liberty Mutual9s Failure to Materially Disclose and Lack of Clarity in 
Specification of the Household Exclusion Liability Limitation 
Utah Code §31 A-21-308 allows differing liability limits in an insurance 
policy "if the policy clearly states" those differing limits. 
As quoted by Liberty Mutual12, Calhoun v. State Farm, supra, allows an 
exclusion in excess of minimum required coverages 
"As long as any exclusions are phrased in 'language which clearly and 
unmistakably communicates to the insured the specific circumstances under 
which the expected coverage will not be provided . . ." [emphasis added] 
12
 See Liberty Mutual Brief, page 23, second paragraph. 
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Many cases establish the principle that exclusions must be clearly and 
unambiguously communicated to the insured. 
In its simplest form, the question thus becomes: What does it mean to "clearly 
state" an exclusion? 
In the Funk & Wagnalls Standard College Dictionary (1963) p. 1160, "clearly" 
is defined, among a myriad of definitions, as: "to free from doubt or ambiguity: make 
plain." 
Ambiguity and clarity are thus at opposite ends of the spectrum. 
In apparent response to Burdene Shores' claims that the wording and structure 
of Liberty Mutual's Insurance policy is ambiguous, unclear and confusing to elderly 
and non-elderly purchasers of insurance, Liberty Mutual has taken great pains in their 
brief to claim that the family exclusion liability limit is unambiguous.13 
Liberty Mutual claims their insurance policy follows the high sounding 
general principles of contract law and states: 
1. Insurance policies are governed according to the rules governing 
ordinary contracts. 
2. The terms in the insurance policy must be harmonized with the policy 
as a whole and all provisions should be given effect if possible. 
3. Ambiguity may be found if the terms used to express the intention of 
the parties may have two or more meanings. 
All of these principles have validity - especially if applied in the context of an 
13
 See Liberty Mutual Brief, page 32, et seq.. 
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arm's length negotiated insurance contract between parties of nearly equal bargaining 
power. Such a situation is not present in this case before this court. 
This is a pure contract of adhesion prepared by a financial giant to take 
advantage of those with essentially nothing and no bargaining power. 
Liberty Mutual is a multi-billion dollar insurance company employing many 
lawyers to protect their financial interests. 
The Shores are elderly, retired persons in their 70s and 80s to whom Liberty 
Mutual has specifically target-marketed their insurance policies. Elderly persons, 
including the Shores, generally have reduced mental capacities - not because they are 
retired veterans14 but because they are elderly persons in their 70s and 80s. Common 
sense and experience dictate that the elderly are frequent targets of unscrupulous 
business practices because of their age and mental state. 
The Guidelines for the Evaluation of Dementia and Age-related Cognitive 
Decline15 state: 
"Declines in memory and cognitive abilities are a normal consequence of 
aging in humans. This is true across cultures and, indeed, in virtually all 
mammalian species. The nosological category of Age-Associated Memory 
Impairment was proposed by a National Institute of Mental Health (NIMH) 
14
 In Liberty Mutual's Brief at page 34, second paragraph, counsel for 
Liberty Mutual claims that the Shores are claiming veterans are superior to others 
and improperly and falsely claims that the Shores feel veterans have disadvantages 
over the rest of the population in mental capacity. This is simply a diversionary 
tactic. 
15
 American Psychological Association, Presidential Task Force on the 
Assessment of Age-Consistent Memory Decline and Dementia (1998). Guidelines 
for the evaluation of dementia and age-related cognitive decline. Washington, DC: 
American Psychological Association. 
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work group to describe older persons with objective memory declines relative 
to their younger years, but cognitive functioning that is normal relative to 
their age peers." (citations omitted) 
Whether Liberty Mutual's marketing practices to the Shores are in the 
category of unscrupulous business practices awaits further discovery which the trial 
court has refused to allow. 
There is no agreement with Liberty Mutual's characterizations of clarity and 
lack of ambiguity in their insurance policy. 
On the one hand counsel for Liberty Mutual argues that we must consider the 
insurance policy as a whole in judging its terms. On the other hand, in their brief 
counsel for Liberty Mutual does exactly the opposite. Liberty Mutual asks the court 
to treat the hidden family exclusion provision as if it were prominently stated with 
other exclusions and limitations (their phrase), but wants it judged independently of 
all other provisions. 
Some scenarios could have existed - but which do not - where Liberty 
Mutual's desired treatment might more likely be valid. Those scenarios include: 
1. Placing all policy limitations in one place so they may more easily be 
found and reviewed, including: 
(a) Placing the family exclusion liability limits on the declarations 
page, or in some other common place, where all the liability 
limits are located. 
(b) Placing important policy provisions, or summaries of those 
provisions, in the declarations or near the beginning of the 
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policy. 
2. Not having conflicting and superceded provisions in various places in 
the insurance policy - but rather, having only one set of provisions applicable to any 
given liability limit, exclusion or other provision. 
3. Phrasing all (especially differing) limitations clearly and in similar 
terms - such as $100,000 / $300,000 general liability and $25,000 / $50,000 for 
insureds as required by Utah Code §31A-21-308. 
4. Phrasing and giving descriptions of policy terms and provisions such 
that persons in the elderly target market are likely to understand those terms. 
We are thus back at the same underlying question on clarity and ambiguity: 
Is the Liberty Mutual family exclusion liability limitation clearly and 
unambiguously stated? 
To Liberty Mutual's counsel, it is clearly stated. 
To Burdene Shores it was hidden from her and certainly not clearly and 
unmistakably communicated to her until after she made a claim. 
Denial of Discovery 
If Judge Pullan properly handled this case at the trial level, then it is probable 
that no further discovery is needful. 
If there are yet any fact dependent issues in this case, then the denial of 
discovery was improper and the motion to allow further discovery should have been 
granted. 
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The fact dependent issues include: 
• Misrepresentations by Liberty Mutual in the sale of the insurance policy to 
the Shores. Do what Liberty Mutual represented the insurance policy to be and what 
it actually was make any difference? 
• Factual issues regarding clarity, or more correctly the lack of clarity and 
ambiguity created by Liberty Mutual's construction and wording of their insurance 
policy. 
• Factual issues as to why the Utah specific family exclusion liability limitation 
was not listed in the declarations; and, all other limitations (including Utah specific 
limitations) were listed in the declarations. Was there a conscious intent to mislead 
or deceive elderly or non-elderly insurance purchasers? 
• How often has Liberty Mutual taken advantage of the Utah specific family 
exclusion liability limit in dealings with its Utah insureds? 
• How were the differing liability limits for insureds (the family exclusion 
liability limit) arrived at and what differing risks were involved in setting those 
differing liability limits. 
Conclusion 
The basic underlying question in this case is a current variation of the question 
posed by Senator Hillyard in the 1986 legislative defeat of the insurance industry's 
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attempt to legislatively validate the family exclusion:16 
"With the unfair and adhesive nature of the family exclusion liability 
limitation, what the Shores ended up with was thinking they had insurance to cover 
them, but by this exclusion, they do not have the insurance they thought they 
purchased and paid for, can Liberty Mutual properly do this? " 
Is the Liberty Mutual behemoth allowed to financially drown the Shores by 
use of an adhesive insurance contract depriving them of what they reasonably 
believed they had purchased when the legislature has specifically rejected such 
provisions? 
Dated: December 12, 2005 
RespectfotiysSubmitted, 
J. Peter Whitmer 
Attorney for Burdene Shores 
16
 From Mastbaum. supra, at page 1046. 
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STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY, Plaintiff and 
Respondent, v. Thomas Layton MASTBAUM and Kathleen Marie Mastbaum, 
Defendants and Appellants. 
^ No. 19779. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
December 2, 1987. 
B.H. Harris and James C. Jenkins, Logan, for defendants and appellants. 
Henry E. Heath and Barbara L. Maw, Salt Lake City, for plaintiff and respondent. 
HOWE, Justice. 
Defendants Thomas Layton Mastbaum and Kathleen Marie Mastbaum, his wife, seek 
reversal of a summary judgment entered by the trial court in favor of plaintiff State Farm 
Mutual Automobile Insurance Company. 
On May 30, 1981, defendants were involved in an automobile accident near Garden 
City, Utah. Kathleen Mastbaum, who was seated in the front passenger seat, sustained 
severe personal injuries. She filed a civil action for damages against her husband, 
Thomas Mastbaum, the driver of the vehicle, alleging that at the time of the accident, he 
was under the influence of alcohol and negligently drove into an oncoming vehicle. 
Thomas had purchased an insurance policy on his vehicle from plaintiff. Plaintiff 
subsequently brought this action for declaratory judgment that the family exclusion 
provision in the policy was valid and enforceable, that it was therefore not required to 
defend Thomas in the civil action brought by his wife, and that plaintiff was not required 
to pay any judgment she might obtain in her action. The trial court, on motion of plaintiff 
for summary judgment, awarded plaintiff the relief sought. Defendants bring this appeal. 
The policy contained the following family or household exclusion: 
THIS INSURANCE DOES NOT APPLY UNDER: (h) COVERAGE 
A ["Bodily Injury Sustained By Other Persons"], TO BODILY INJURY 
TO ANY INSURED OR ANY MEMBER OF THE FAMILY OF AN 
INSURED RESIDING IN THE SAME HOUSEHOLD AS THE 
INSURED. 
While this case was pending on appeal in this Court but before oral argument, we decided 
Farmers Insurance Exchange v. Call, 712P.2d 231 (Utah 1985). In that case, we held 
that a household or family exclusion clause in an automobile insurance policy 
contravenes the statutory requirements found in Utah's No-Fault Insurance 
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Act, Utah Code Ann. §§ 31-41-1 to -13 (1974, Supp.1985) (now sections 31A-22--306 
to -309 (1986)), as to the minimum benefits which must be provided to all persons 
sustaining personal injuries. We found it unnecessary to address the validity of the 
exclusion clause with respect to insurance coverage provided by the policy in excess of 
the statutorily mandated minimums. However, in that case, a majority of this Court 
allowed recovery on the policy in excess of the statutory minimum amount because the 
insurer was unable to produce any evidence that the insurance policy had ever been 
delivered to the insured. In the instant case, that void in the evidence does not exist since 
it is undisputed that Thomas Mastbaum did receive a copy of the insurance policy at the 
time it was issued by plaintiff. 
The sole question then for our determination in this case is whether the household and 
family exclusion is valid in the policy issued by plaintiff as to amounts and benefits 
provided by the policy in excess of those which are statutorily mandated. In a case 
involving a policy with a somewhat analogous exclusion, Allstate Insurance Co. v. U.S. 
Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 619 P.2d 329 (Utah 1980), we held that an exclusion of a 
named driver was unenforceable only to the extent of statutory minimum coverage. In 
sustaining the exclusion as to policy amounts above the minimum coverage, we said: 
Our decision does not, however, read the named driver exclusionary 
endorsement out of the contract entirely. Rather, contracting parties are 
free to limit coverage in excess of the minimum required limits, and the 
exclusion found in the contract is valid in relation to any coverage 
exceeding the minimum amounts. Thus, a balance is struck between the 
necessity of securing minimum automobile liability coverage and the 
availability of lower premiums because of the exclusion of high insurance 
risks. This effectuates the express two-fold purpose of the Utah No-Fault 
Insurance Act which is to require the payment of certain prescribed 
benefits in respect to motor vehicle accidents while stabilizing the rising 
costs of automobile accident insurance. 
Allstate Insurance Co., 619 P.2d at 333 (footnotes omitted). In so holding, we relied on 
Utah Code Ann. § 41—12—21(g), which provides: 
Any policy which grants the coverage required for a motor vehicle 
liability policy may also grant any lawful coverage in excess of or in 
addition to the coverage specified for a motor vehicle liability policy and 
such excess or additional coverage shall not be subject to the provisions of 
this act.... 
We also cited with approval and followed Estate ofNeal v. Farmers Insurance Exchange, 
93 Nev. 348, 566P.2d 81 (1977). 
Two years after our decision in Allstate Insurance Co. v. U.S. Fidelity & Guaranty 
Co., supra, we relied upon its precedence in deciding Dairy land Insurance Corp. v. 
Smith, 646 P.2d 737 (Utah 1982). In that case, an insurer brought suit to void an 
automobile policy due to material misrepresentations made by the owner of the policy as 
to who would drive the vehicle. We reversed a trial court ruling that the policy was void 
ab initio and held, on the authority of Allstate, that the policy could not be rescinded after 
the occurrence of an accident to the extent of statutorily required minimum coverage, but 
could be rescinded as to amounts in excess of the minimum coverage. 
The vast majority of cases in which the issue before us has been decided have held 
that household exclusions or analogous exclusions are enforceable with respect to policy 
amounts in excess of the statutory minimum required amount. Estate ofNeal v. Farmers 
Insurance Exchange, supra; DeWittv. Young, 229 Kan. 474, 625 P.2d 478 (1981); 
Arceneauxv. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 113 Ariz. 216, 550P.2d 87 
(1976); Allstate Insurance Co. v. Wyoming Insurance Department, 612 V. 2d 810 
(Wyo.1983); Staserv. Fulton, 684 S.W.2d 306 (Ky.Ct.App.1984); Universal 
Underwriters Insurance Co. v. American Motorists Insurance Co., 541 F.Supp. 755 
(N.D.Miss. 1982) (applying Mississippi law); Pennsylvania National Mutual 
Casualty Insurance Co. v. Parker, 282 S.C. 546, 320 S.R2d 458 (Ct.App.1984); State 
Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co., 307 Md. 
631, 516 A.2d 586 (1986). In reaching their decisions, two appellate courts have cited 
with approval and relied upon our decision in Allstate Insurance Co. v. U.S. Fidelity & 
Guaranty Co., supra. See State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Nationwide 
Mutual Insurance Co., supra, Pennsylvania National Mutual Casualty Insurance Co. v. 
Parker, supra. Another appellate court, although not citing Allstate Insurance Co. v. U.S. 
Fidelity & Guaranty, employed the same reasoning as we did in Allstate, to wit, freedom 
of contract to limit coverage in excess of the minimum required amounts thereby 
presumably obtaining a lower premium because of the exclusion of a high risk. Staser v. 
Fulton, supra. 
The leading case espousing the minority view that a household exclusion is invalid as 
to all amounts of the policy is Meyer v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 
689 P.2d 585 (Colo. 1984). In that case, the court, after recognizing that there were "two 
equally compelling arguments," held that because the statutes of that state authorized the 
writing of insurance policies providing greater coverage than the statutory minimum, 
there was a legislative intent to avoid inadequate compensation to victims of automobile 
accidents. A dissenting opinion pointed out that the court's decision was contrary to the 
majority of appellate courts which have considered this issue and which have adopted the 
rule that although an insurance policy must comply with statutory requirements, a statute 
has no effect upon insurance which it does not require. The Court of Appeals of 
Maryland, in State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Nationwide Mutual 
Insurance Co., supra, recently had precisely the same issue before it as we do in the 
instant case. In a well-considered opinion, the court found the majority opinion in Meyer 
to be unpersuasive and stated that while Maryland's compulsory insurance statutes also 
have the purpose of assuring recovery for innocent victims of motor vehicle accidents, 
the court did not view that purpose as extending beyond the prescribed statutory 
minimum coverage so far as the household exclusion was concerned. 
We adhere to Allstate and the majority view and hold that the household or family 
exclusion is valid in this state as to insurance provided by an automobile policy in excess 
of the statutorily mandated amounts and benefits. While the minority view is attractive 
from the standpoint of an injured victim, the policy must be enforced as written when its 
provisions do not conflict with our mandatory automobile insurance statutes. The 
summary judgment is reversed, and the case is remanded to the trial court for further 
proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
HALL, C.J., concurs. 
ZIMMERMAN, Justice, (concurring) 
As a matter of public policy and in the absence of some legislative statement on the 
subject, I agree with the majority that household member exclusions should be invalid 
only up to the limits set by our mandatory automobile insurance statutes. However, 
Justice Durham's recitation of the legislative history surrounding the 1986 amendment of 
the relevant statutes does persuade me that with respect to insurance policies written after 
the effective date of that act, household member exclusions will be entirely invalid 
because the legislature has now made it clear that such exclusions are contrary to public 
policy. However, I cannot join Justice Durham in finding that the expression of such an 
intention in 1986 should be applied to the determination of the validity of a clause 
contained in a contract written many years earlier and governed by a predecessor statute. 
With respect to the adhesion contract arguments made by Justice Durham, I would 
not reach these since this issue is not adequately presented on appeal. 
Inasmuch as there are no grounds for reversing the instant case, I think it unnecessary 
for us to decide at this juncture whether Stoker v. Stoker, 616 P.2d 590 (Utah 1980), 
abrogated interspousal immunity 
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with respect to actions grounded in negligence as well as those grounded in intentional 
torts. 
STEWART, Associate C.J., concurs in the concurring opinion of Justice ZIMMERMAN. 
DURHAM, Justice: (dissenting) 
I cannot agree with the majority opinions reasoning or result because it fails to 
address the viability of the household exclusion under public policy as reflected in Utah's 
automobile insurance statutes, the applicability of adhesion contract principles, and the 
question of interspousal tort immunity. 
I would reverse the summary judgment and enter judgment in favor of defendant on 
public policy grounds. On adhesion contract principles alone, I would reverse and remand 
this case for further evidentiary proceedings. Nor do I believe that inter-spousal tort 
immunity is a barrier to litigation between the Mastbaums. 
I 
Public Policy Considerations 
The majority errs in assuming that the state legislature intended to allow a household 
exclusion for coverage beyond the statutory minimum. The legislative history on this 
question suggests that the legislature does not support the household exclusion, but 
instead considers it to be contrary to public policy. 
The legislature recodified Utah's insurance laws in its 1985 and 1986 sessions. The 
1986 session placed all changes to the state insurance laws into Senate Bill 91. Two 
sections in particular are relevant to this discussion: first, Utah Code Ann. § 31 A-22—303 
(motor vehicle liability coverage), which generally describes motor vehicle liability 
coverage required under the statutory scheme, and second, section 31 A-22—309 
(limitations, exclusions, and conditions to personal injury protection), which describes 
the allowable exclusions for personal injury protection coverage in automobile insurance 
policies. Prior to the passage of Senate Bill 91, which was effective July 1, 1986, 
subsection 2 of section 31 A-22—309 read as follows: 
(2) Any insurer may exclude benefits: 
(a)(i) for any injury sustained by the injured while occupying another 
motor vehicle owned by the insured and not insured under the policy; or 
(ii) for any injury sustained by any person while operating the insured 
motor vehicle without the express or implied consent of the insured or 
while not in lawful possession of the insured motor vehicle. 
(b) to any injured person, if the person's conduct contributed to his 
injury.... 
Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-309 (1985 Insurance Code Recodification pamphlet edition) 
(emphasis added). 
This section designates the exclusions an insurer "may" attach to a policy providing 
personal injury protection coverage under Utah state laws. It does not specify that these 
exclusions are allowable only for amounts below the statutory minimum, but indicates 
that an insurer may only exclude benefits in those few and narrow situations. 
That such was the legislatures intention before the 1986 recodification is suggested 
by the history of Senate Bill 91, which amended section 31A-22--309 to read: 
(2)(a) Any insurer issuing personal injury protection coverage under this 
part may only exclude from this coverage benefits: 
(i) for any injury sustained by the injured while occupying another 
motor vehicle owned by the insured and not insured under the policy; 
(ii) for any injury sustained by any person while operating the insured 
motor vehicle without the express or implied consent of the insured or 
while not in lawful possession of the insured motor vehicle; or 
(iii) to any injured person, if the person's conduct contributed to his 
injury: 
(A) by intentionally causing injury to himself; or 
(B) while committing a felony. 
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Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-309 (1986) (emphasis added). 
The legislature thus removed any ambiguity about the validity of exclusions not 
specifically mentioned in section 31A-22--3 09. Insurers may only exclude coverage for 
the designated reasons. The household exclusion is not among those. It is not 
unreasonable to infer that the legislature always intended household exclusion clauses, 
and others not mentioned in section 31A-22—309, to be invalid and made the foregoing 
change to eliminate the argument that they were permissible beyond the statutory 
minimum because they were not explicitly excluded. 
This interpretation of the automobile insurance statutory scheme is bolstered by the 
record of the state senate's consideration of a proposed amendment in Senate Bill 91 to 
section 31 A-22—303. Senate Bill 91 contained a large number of amendments to Utah's 
insurance laws. The majority of these amendments were suggested to the legislature by 
the Insurance Code Task Force, which was comprised primarily of representatives of the 
insurance industry, as well as several members of the state legislature. The task force 
minutes from January 10, 1986, reflect that the draft version of Senate Bill 91 was 
changed to add an additional clause to section 31 A-22—303. That clause was to be 
inserted as subsection (d) under subsection (3), and the subsection was then to read as 
follows: 
(3)"Motor vehicle liability coverage need not insure any liability: 
(a) under any workers compensation law under Title 35; 
(b) resulting from bodily injury to or death of an employee of the named 
insured, other than a domestic employee, while engaged in the 
employment of the insured, or while engaged in the operation, 
maintenance, or repair of a designated vehicle; 
(c) resulting from damage to property owned by, rented to, bailed to, or 
transported by the insured; or 
(d) resulting from bodily injury or death of any insured or any member of 
an insureds family residing in the insured's household. 
Utah S.B. 91, 46th Leg. draft version 1-06-86, at 319-20 (emphasis added). 
Thus, when presented to the senate for consideration in January 1986, Senate Bill 91 
explicitly allowed insurers to exclude household members from coverage under 
automobile liability policies. This version of the bill apparently remained unchallenged 
until February 24, 1986. On that date, Senator Hillyard moved to amend Senate Bill 91 to 
delete the clause allowing the household exclusion from section 31A-22—303(3) because 
the legislature had not properly considered the exclusion's extensive impact. 
In arguing to delete the pertinent language, Senator Hillyard pointed out the unfair 
and adhesive nature of this type of exclusion. He stated, "What you're going to do is end 
up with people with exposure who think they have insurance to cover them, but by this 
exclusion, they're not going to have any insurance." Senator Hillyard then requested the 
senate membership to "vote affirmatively to remove this [household exclusion] and let it 
be put in later if that's the decision of the legislature through legislative intent." 
A member of the task force told the senate membership that the task force itself had 
fully considered the household exclusion question and felt that it was appropriate and 
based on sound public policy. Nonetheless, the senate voted to approve Senator Hillyard's 
amendment, thereby deleting the language allowing a household exclusion in liability 
policies. This process, combined with the straight-forward language in section 31A-22--
309, suggests that the legislature has never intended to permit household exclusion 
clauses. Thus, the majority opinion's premise regarding legislative intent is at least open 
to question. 
In Farmers Insurance Exchange v. Call, 712 P.2d 231 (Utah 1985), we noted that a 
number of jurisdictions had found that the household exclusion clause violated public 
policy, even for coverage exceeding that mandated by statute. Id. at 236 n. 2; see, e.g., 
Meyer v. State Farm Mutual 
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Automobile Insurance, Co., 689P.2d 585, 592 (Colo. 1984). At that time, however, we 
declined to address the question presented by this appeal. Call, 712 P.2d at 236. In light 
of the legislative history of permissible exclusions under Utah's automobile insurance 
statutes and the language of the statutes themselves, I would find the household exclusion 
void in all cases. Accordingly, I would reverse the judgment of the trial court and enter 
judgment in appellants1 favor. 
n 
Adhesion Contract Theory 
The majority opinion states that the primary issue is whether the household exclusion 
is valid as to amounts in excess of those which are statutorily mandated and relies on the 
principle of freedom of contract to permit the extension of the household exclusion to 
coverage beyond the statutory minimums. This approach fails to address adhesion 
contract theory, raised by appellants in the trial court and on appeal. Aside from public 
policy considerations, the adhesion issue is sufficient by itself to reverse and remand the 
trial court's decision. 
Appellants relied on the adhesion contract theory in the trial court and specifically 
requested the court to resolve that issue. The court refused to do so, but instead noted that 
the insurance contract was "valid," implying that the adhesion theory was inapplicable. 
Before this Court, appellants cite several cases from other states dealing with the 
household exclusion and argue that appellants' reasonable expectations were not met. 
Thus, the issue is properly before this Court and should be treated. 
As this Court recently noted, "Like credit life and disability insurance, automobile 
insurance is generally sold through adhesion contracts that are not negotiated at arm's 
length. Purchasers commonly rely on the assumption that they are fully covered by the 
insurance that they buy." Farmers Insurance Exchange v. Call, 712 P.2d at 236 (Utah 
1985). In fact, this Court has examined a number of contracts in light of adhesion theory 
with varying results. See, e.g., Resource Management Co. v. Weston Ranch and Livestock 
Co., 706 P.2d 1028, 1040-49 (Utah 1985) (contract terms not unconscionable and 
contract not one of adhesion); System Concepts, Inc. v. Dixon, 669 P.2d 421, 429 (Utah 
1983) (no disparate bargaining status between parties); General Motors Acceptance 
Corp. v. Martinez, 668 P.2d 498, 501 (Utah 1983) (adhesive nature of insurance policy is 
basis of duty to notify); White v. Fox, 665 P.2d 1297, 1300 (Utah 1983) (contract not 
adhesive; parties' bargaining status was equivalent); BekinsBar VRanch v. Huth, 664 
P.2d 455, 459-64 (Utah 1983) (finance charges in loan agreement not unconscionable). 
In the leading case of Gray v. Zurich Insurance Co., 65 Cal.2d 263, 419 P.2d 168, 54 
Cai.Rptr. 104 (1966), Justice Tobriner of the California Supreme Court set forth the 
principle of reasonable expectations in adhesion insurance contracts. 
Although courts have long followed the basic precept that they would look 
to the words of the contract to find the meaning which the parties expected 
from them, they have also applied the doctrine of the adhesion contract to 
insurance policies, holding that in view of the disparate bargaining status 
of the parties we must ascertain that meaning of the contract which the 
insured would reasonably expect. 
65 Cal.2d at 269-70, 419 P.2d at 171-72, 54 Cai.Rptr. at 107-08. 
Judicial determination of the insured's reasonable expectations does not necessarily 
depend upon the presence of an ambiguity in the policy. See, e.g., Powers v. Detroit 
Automobile Inter4nsurance Exchange, All Mich. 602, 632 n. 8, 398 N.W. 2d 411, 424 n. 
8 (1986); Stordahlv. Government Employees Insurance Co., 564P.2d 63, 65—66 (Alaska 
1977). Indeed, the insured's complete failure to read the policy's provisions, exclusions, 
or limitations may not be determinative of his reasonable expectations unless the insurer 
can demonstrate that the failure to read was unreasonable. Keeton, Insurance Law Rights 
at Variance with Policy Provisions, 83 HarvX.Rev. 961, 967-68 (1970); 
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see Hawaiian Insurance and Guaranty Co. v. Brooks, 67 Hawaii 285, 686 P.2d 23 
(1984); Reserve Insurance Co. v. Pisciotta, 30 Cai.3d 800, 810 n. 3, 640 P.2d 764, 769 n. 
3, 180 Cai.Rptr. 628, 633 n. 3 (1982). 
At least one state has used the adhesion contract theory to invalidate a household 
exclusion clause in an automobile insurance policy. In Transamerica Insurance Co. v. 
Royle, 202 Mont. 173, 656 P.2d 820 (1983), the Supreme Court of Montana considered 
the case of a mother who had negligently caused an automobile accident in which her 
daughter, a passenger in the mother's car, was seriously injured. The insurance policy 
covering the automobile contained a household exclusion that denied coverage for 
injuries incurred by a person living or residing in the insured's household at the time of 
loss. After determining that parent-child immunity did not present a barrier to the 
daughter's suit, the Montana Supreme Court concluded: 
[W]e hold that the household exclusion clause is invalid due to its failure 
to "honor the reasonable expectations" of the purchaser of the policy.... 
"The objectively reasonable expectations of applicants and intended 
beneficiaries regarding the terms of insurance contracts, will be honored 
even though painstaking study of the policy provisions would have 
negated those expectations." 
Royle, 656 P.2d at 824 (quoting Keeton, Insurance Law Rights at Variance with Policy 
Provisions, 83 Harv.L.Rev. 961, 967 (1970)) 
The importance of considering adhesion theory in this case is obvious. The majority 
opinion's reliance on the principle of a freedom of contract between the parties is a 
misplaced if the insurance policy is adhesive in nature because the parties' ability to 
freely contract is largely illusory where adhesion theory applies. The Supreme Court of 
New Mexico in Estep v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 103 N.M. 105, 
703 P.2d 882 (1985), noted: 
With respect to the freedom of contract argument, we suggest, as did the 
court a in the second case of Mutual ofEnumclaw Insurance Co. v. 
Wiscomb, 97 Wash.2d 203, 211^643 P.2d 441, 445 (1982), that to say 
there is freedom of contract regarding inclusion or exclusion of coverage 
for family members in these cases "is to ignore reality." The discussion in 
Wiscomb of the "take-it-or-leave-it" nature of obtaining automobile 
liability coverage, and the effect of the policy's exclusion on third parties 
who are or may be ignorant of the insurance arrangements and unable or 
incompetent to contract for coverage for themselves, illustrates the 
fragility of any assertion that the terms of this or similar insurance policies 
truly are the product of conscious bargaining between the parties. The 
argument might be more credibly made were there evidence that insureds 
had been, or traditionally are, offered the choice of including or excluding 
coverage for family members. There is no such evidence in this record. 
103 N.M. at 109-10, 703 P.2d at 886-87. Absent findings of fact regarding the 
reasonable expectations of the parties, the Course of negotiations between them, and the 
circumstances existing when the contact was made, it is impossible to conclude, as does 
the majority opinion, that the contract terms were arrived at freely in this case. 
When reviewing motions for summary judgment, this Court views issues of fact in le 
light most favorable to the party opposing summary judgment. Call, 712 P.2d at 37; 
Mountain States Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Atkin, Wright & Miles, Chartered, 681 
P.2d 1258, 1261 (Utah 984). The parties' failure to include a copy of the insurance policy 
in the record and the lack of evidence directed to the adhesion claims make it necessary 
to remand this case to the trial court. Thomas Mastbaum did state in his affidavit that he 
as unable to read or review the text of le insurance policy before he purchased it, lat he 
was unaware of the household exclusion clause, and that he assumed the insurance policy 
covered all parties, including his wife, for any injuries sustained in n automobile accident 
involving his vehicle. However, in the absence of the policy itself and without a more 
complete description 
of the nature of the negotiations and circumstances surrounding the contracts formation, 
there is too much uncertainty and too little evidence from which to draw a conclusion 
regarding the Mastbaums1 reasonable expectations. Hence, apart from questions of public 
policy, this action should be remanded to the trial court to complete the record regarding 
appellants' claims of adhesion. 
Ill 
Interspousal Tort Immunity 
Finally, I dissent from the majority opinion because it completely omits reference to 
the doctrine of interspousal tort immunity, which was extensively briefed and relied upon 
by the parties on appeal. This Court thoroughly discussed the doctrine of interspousal tort 
immunity in Stoker v. Stoker, 616 P.2d 590 (Utah 1980). In reaching a decision to 
repudiate the doctrine of interspousal tort immunity, this Court relied upon Utah Code 
Ann. § 30--2—4 (1974), which states in pertinent part that a married woman "may 
prosecute and defend all actions for the preservation and protection of her rights and 
property as if unmarried." The Court also pointed out that the statute was enacted in 
derogation of the common law and must therefore be liberally construed in order to meet 
its purpose and to promote justice. Id. at 591; Utah Code Ann. § 68—3—2 (1986). The 
Court in Stoker emphasized the broad scope of its analysis by proclaiming, "Our holding 
today reaffirms the Legislative abrogation of Interspousal Immunity.(fnl) Id. at 592. 
This Court has also rejected the notion that the potential for collusion is a sufficient 
rationale for prohibiting certain kinds of litigation. SeeMalan v. Lewis, 693 P.2d 661, 
674 (Utah 1984); Call 712 P.2d at 235-36. As this Court stated in Call: 
Furthermore, we are not persuaded that the collusion rationale that the 
Court relied upon in the Kay [State Farm Mutual Auto Insurance Co. v. 
Kay, 26 Utah 2d 195, 487 P.2d 852 (1972); Kay v. Kay, 30 Utah 2d 94, 
513 P.2d 1372 (1973)] opinions remains an adequate justification for the 
household exclusion clause. InMalan v. Lewis, Utah, 693 P.2d 661, 674 
(1984), this Court determined that the Utah Guest Statute is 
unconstitutional and found the collusion rationale to be insufficient to 
deny coverage to innocent guest passengers injured in automobile 
accidents. In addition, the risk of collusion in intrafamily litigation has 
never been accepted by this Court as grounds for endorsing the parent-
child immunity doctrine, which has likewise never been established by the 
legislature. 
Call, 111 P.2d at 235. The Court in Call also agreed with the Kansas Supreme Court, 
which pointed out that "the possibility of collusion exists to a certain extent in any case. 
Everyday [sic] we depend on juries and trial judges to sift evidence in order to determine 
the facts and arrive at proper verdicts. Experience has shown that the courts are quite 
adequate for this task." Id. at 235 (quoting Nocktonick v. Nocktonick, 227 Kan. 758, 768— 
69, 611 P.2d 135, 142 (1980)). Interspousal tort immunity would therefore not be a 
barrier to Kathleen Mastbaum's efforts to recover from her husband. 
For the reasons set forth above, I would reverse and enter judgment in favor of 
appellants on public policy grounds. Apart from questions of public policy, however, I 
would still reverse and remand to the lower court for further evidentiary proceedings. In 
either instance, the doctrine of interspousal tort immunity would not pose a barrier to 
proceedings between the Mastbaums. 
Footnotes: 
1. This interpretation is consistent with the "open courts" provision of the Utah 
Constitution article I, section 11, which states: 
All courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury done to him and 
his person, property, reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law, 
which shall be administered without denial or unnecessary delay; and no 
person shall be barred from prosecuting or defending before any tribunal 
in this state, by himself or counsel, any civil cause for which he is a party. 
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